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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a personal injury case in a Minnesota trial court in March 2000, 
the plaintiff’s lawyer moved for a mistrial on the basis that the judge’s 
law clerk, a man with severe disabilities, had worked in the courtroom in 
the presence of the jury.1  The attorney stated that the jury’s comparison 
 
 †     Luther Granquist is a Staff Attorney at the Minnesota Disability Law Center. 
 1. In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Contained in Panel Case No. 15976, 
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of the law clerk with his client would diminish his chances of a 
recovery.2  The trial judge denied the motion.3  After the jury found for 
the defendant on the issue of liability, the judge also denied a motion for 
a new trial brought, in part, on the same basis.4  Subsequently, the trial 
judge reported what he deemed to be plaintiff counsel’s unprofessional 
conduct to the Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional 
Responsibility.5  Ultimately, in In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct 
Contained in Panel Case No. 15976, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
upheld a determination by a panel of the Minnesota Lawyers 
Professional Responsibility Board that the attorney had violated Rule 
8.4(d) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct (engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) by bringing the post-
trial motion on those grounds.6 
In 1999, in In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Contained in 
Panel File 98-26, the court had held that a prosecutor violated Rule 
8.4(d) by bringing a motion to prohibit an African-American public 
defender from being co-counsel for an African-American man charged 
with robbery of a Caucasian couple.7  The Panel Case No. 15976 court 
extended this holding—that race can never be used as a basis for limiting 
an attorney’s participation in a court proceeding—to “encompass 
situations where disability is used to limit a court employee’s 
participation in a court proceeding.”8  The court observed that the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”)9 prohibits discrimination in 
 
653 N.W.2d 452, 454 (Minn. 2002) [hereinafter Panel Case No. 15976].  In this case, the 
Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility referred the complaint to a 
District Ethics Committee for investigation. Id. at 455. Based upon that investigation, the 
director issued an admonition based on the conclusion that both the initial and post-trial 
motions constituted unprofessional conduct in violation of Rule 3.1 (frivolous motions) 
and Rule 8.4(d) (prejudicial conduct) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.  
See also MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.1, 8.4(d) (2002).  The attorney exercised his right to 
have this decision reviewed by a panel of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board.  
Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 455. After a hearing, that panel amended the 
admonition by limiting it solely to the post-trial motion.  Id.  Both the trial judge and the 
attorney sought discretionary review of the determination; the Minnesota Supreme Court 
granted review and consolidated the two cases.  Id. at 454. 
 2. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 454. 
 3. Id. at 455. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 457. 
 7. In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Contained in Panel File 98-26, 597 
N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 1999) [hereinafter Panel File 98-26]. 
 8. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 456. 
 9. MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-20 (2002). 
2
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employment, housing, and other areas on the basis of disability as well as 
on the basis of race.10  Because Minnesota treats race-based and 
disability-based discrimination equally under the MHRA,11 the court 
concluded that the determination that the plaintiff’s attorney violated 
Rule 8.4(d) was not “clearly erroneous.”12 
In both this case and the previous case involving race 
discrimination, the Lawyers Board Panel issued a private admonition.13  
Whether that action is by the director of the Office, by a Lawyers Board 
Panel when an attorney requests review of that action (as in the present 
case), or after the director submits the issue to a Lawyers Board Panel for 
hearing, a private admonition may be issued only if the lawyer’s 
unprofessional conduct is of an “isolated and non-serious nature.”14  In 
the race discrimination case, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the 
private admonition given by the panel on the basis that race-based 
misconduct was inherently serious.15  The court, however, exercised its 
prerogative to determine what disciplinary action was appropriate.  
Because the prosecutor demonstrated remorse, lacked malicious intent, 
and took remedial actions, the court issued a private admonition.16  In 
 
 10. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 456-57. 
 11. See MINN. STAT. § 363.12 (2002) (stating the policy of the MHRA). 
 12. Id. at 458.  The Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board Panel had also 
found that the post-trial motion violated Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1, 
which prohibits a lawyer from bringing a motion “unless there is a basis for doing so that 
is not frivolous” or “which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification 
or reversal of existing law.”  Id.  The supreme court noted that the panel relied on the fact 
that the attorney failed to support his position with legal authority.  Id. at 457.  (The 
parties to the disciplinary proceeding, the Panel of the Lawyers Board, the court and the 
amici in the supreme court, all failed to find any other case involving comparable 
circumstances, whether involving disciplinary action or not.)  The court expressed 
concern that overzealous application of Rule 3.1 could inhibit attorneys from bringing 
issues of first impression, but did not reach the issue because of the determination that the 
attorney’s conduct violated Rule 8.4(d).  Id. 
 13. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 455; Panel File 98-26, 597 N.W.2d at 
567. 
 14. An admonition may be issued “if the Director concludes that a lawyer’s conduct 
was unprofessional but of an isolated and non-serious nature . . . .”  MINN. R. PROF. 
CONDUCT 8(d)(2) (2002).  In this case, the panel issued an Amended Admonition 
pursuant to this rule provision.  After a hearing on disciplinary charges, an admonition 
may be issued only if the unprofessional conduct is of an “isolated and non-serious 
nature . . . .”  MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 9(j)(iii) (2002). 
 15. Panel File 98-26, 597 N.W.2d at 568. 
 16. Id. at 568-69.  The court noted “with favor the sincerity of respondent’s remorse 
after she recognized her misconduct.”  Id. at 568.  The court stated: 
The record in the present case also indicates that once respondent realized the 
impropriety of her motion, she took immediate action to mitigate the 
3
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Panel Case No. 15976, the court reviewed the circumstances of the 
earlier case and stated that there they had “unequivocally held that race-
based misconduct is inherently serious.”17  Nevertheless, when faced 
with disability-based misconduct the court concluded “that the Panel did 
not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably by finding that 
respondent’s conduct in this particular situation was non-serious.”18  The 
court based this ruling, at least in part, on the fact the prosecutor in In re 
Panel File 98-26 misused the power of the state by interfering with a 
defendant’s right to counsel.19  By contrast, the court stated, the 
plaintiff’s attorney “did not exercise any authority or control over the 
disabled clerk.”20  Thus, the court reasoned, “[a]ny discriminatory effect 
from the motion was indirect . . . .”21 
Unprofessional conduct by an attorney representing the state is 
indeed serious.  But in both cases, the actual discriminatory effect of 
preventing a criminal defendant from being represented by the counsel of 
his choice or by altering the customary practice of assigning a law clerk’s 
responsibilities could only be achieved by asking the court to be the 
instrument of discrimination.  From that perspective, the actions of both 
attorneys were alike; the court prefaced this explanation of its holding 
 
consequences of her misconduct . . . . Since the incident, respondent has 
repeatedly expressed remorse over her actions, has apologized and has 
vowed that such a lapse of judgment will not happen again, and, to that end, 
has taken precautions to ensure that her error is not repeated. 
Id. at 569. 
 17. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W. 2d at 456. 
 18. Id. at 458.  The court also held that the conduct was “isolated,” for only two 
arguments were made on the same issue during the same trial and there were no other 
instances of misconduct.  Id.  at 457.  Elsewhere in the decision, but not in the discussion 
of the appropriate discipline, the court noted that the plaintiff’s attorney stated when he 
made the motion that he brought it with “great reluctance” and “acknowledged that the 
motion was ‘outrageous and distasteful for the [c]ourt.’ ”  Id. at 454.  The court also 
noted the attorney’s statements and testimony at the hearing: 
Addressing his reasons for bringing the motion for a mistrial respondent 
stated, “I was thinking of fairness and I was thinking of my client and his 
wishes with respect to at least raising the issue to the judge.”  He also 
asserted that his duty to ensure his client received a fair trial overrode his 
reluctance to bring the motion.  Finally, he stated that he would not have 
made the objection in a case that did not involve disability issues that might 
lead to similar comparisons. 
Id. at 455.  The court stated without further comment in the review of the procedural 
posture of the case that the attorney had sought review of the initial private admonition 
by the director.  Id. at 454. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
4
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that the misconduct involved was “non-serious” with a longer discussion 
that focused on a perceived tension between the rights of two persons 
with disabilities, the injured plaintiff and the law clerk.22  After 
acknowledging that the law clerk with a disability had a right to perform 
his job in the courtroom, the court stated: 
But here we have the perceived rights of two disabled persons 
potentially in conflict with one another . . . .  Respondent’s 
client was concerned that the jury would compare the law 
clerk’s more severe disability with his less severe disability 
and that comparison would unduly influence the jury to decide 
against him on his claims and deprive him of a fair trial.  
Ironically, the concern of respondent’s client, as argued by 
respondent, was not that the law clerk’s disability prevented 
him from capably performing his job, but that the law clerk’s 
demonstrated capability would diminish the client’s disability 
claim.  Respondent’s motion can be viewed as an inappropriate 
attempt to address the respective rights of two disabled 
persons, rather than elevating the rights of one over the rights 
of another.  If respondent was concerned that the jury might 
make improper comparisons, respondent could have addressed 
those concerns during voir dire.  Nonetheless, when viewed in 
context, we conclude that the Panel did not act arbitrarily, 
capriciously or unreasonably by finding that respondent’s 
conduct in this particular situation was non-serious.23 
There is a vast difference between stating “unequivocally” that race-
based misconduct is “inherently serious,”24 and viewing the motion to 
bar a law clerk with a disability from the courtroom as “an inappropriate 
attempt to address the respective rights of two disabled persons, rather 
than elevating the rights of one over the rights of the other.”25  The 
court’s analysis comes perilously close to asserting that discrimination 
on the basis of disability is more permissible if done by or on behalf of a 
person with a disability.26  The court’s statements imply that 
discrimination on the basis of disability by an officer of the court is less 
serious than discrimination on the basis of race.27  The court’s statements 
 
 22. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 457-58. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Panel File 98-26, 597 N.W.2d at 567. 
 25. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 456. 
 26. See id. at 457-58 (responding to complainant’s assertion that a more serious 
sanction is warranted, the court stated that here the issue involved the perceived rights of 
two disabled persons potentially in conflict with one another). 
 27. See id. (discussing statutory objections to end race-based discrimination and 
5
Granquist: Unlawful Discrimination or a Necessity for a Fair Trial?: Exclusi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
4 GRANQUIST - PAGINATED.DOC 12/8/2003  2:50 PM 
460 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
 
also suggest that it was not unreasonable for the attorney to bring the 
motions that he did, at least the initial motion.28 
Nevertheless, the court did characterize the motion as 
“inappropriate.”29  The court’s decision assumes, without stating, that it 
was appropriately denied.30  What the court does not do is analyze the 
tension between the “perceived rights of two disabled persons potentially 
in conflict with one another.”31  That analysis would include a more 
detailed discussion of the law clerk’s employment rights, the plaintiff’s 
right to a fair trial, and the trial court’s obligation to ensure a fair trial 
and yet refrain from discriminating against the law clerk on the basis of 
disability.   
II. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY WITH REGARD 
TO THE TERMS, CONDITIONS, OR PRIVILEGES OF EMPLOYMENT 
IS PROHIBITED BY STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that a “disabled court 
employee has a right to perform his job in the courtroom.”32  Both state 
and federal law appear to support this unqualified statement.33  The 
MHRA states that it is an unfair employment practice to discriminate on 
the basis of disability “with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, 
terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment.” 34  
For a law clerk, the opportunity to work in the courtroom seems to be 
included within the “terms,” “conditions,” or “privileges” of 
employment.35  The trial judge testified at the disciplinary hearing that 
his two law clerks divided the responsibility of assisting the judge on 
cases.36  In addition to preparing memoranda addressing the issues in a 
case, the trial judge assigned each of his law clerks to communicate with 
 
respondent’s objective in bringing the motion, which is distinguishable from race-based 
discrimination in In re Panel File 98-26). 
 28. See id. at 458 (stating that an discriminatory effect from the motion was 
indirect). 
 29. Id.  
 30. See id. (noting respondent could have addressed any concerns during voir dire).  
 31. Id. at 457. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2003); MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (2002). 
 34. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Complainant’s Brief and Appendix, app. at 43, Panel Case No. 15976, 653 
N.W.2d 452 (Minn. 2002) (Nos. C6-02-139 and C3-02-227) [hereinafter Complainant’s 
Brief]; Record at 14-18, Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board (No. 15976) 
[hereinafter Record]. 
6
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the jury panel, to seat jury members for voir dire, to administer oaths, 
and to be available to the judge to respond to questions of law that arose 
during a trial.37  The plaintiff’s motion sought an order from the court 
that would remove the clerk from the courtroom and change the 
customary practice, the judge’s law clerks working in the courtroom 
during trials, solely because of his disability.38  Given the broad scope of 
the unfair discriminatory practices in the statute, the reasonable 
conclusion seems that the law clerk would suffer discrimination 
actionable under the MHRA if the court were to grant the motion.39 
The same result would appear to follow from the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  Title I of the ADA proscribes discrimination 
on the basis of disability in employment by specified classes of 
employers, which include states.40  The statute covers a similarly broad 
range of employment actions by requiring that “[n]o covered entity shall 
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of 
the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, 
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.”41  The statute defines “discriminate” in broad terms to 
include “limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee 
in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such 
applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or 
employee.”42  The basic rule in subsection (a) is as broad as the 
Minnesota statute.  The gloss on “discriminate” in subsection (b) is even 
broader.  A law clerk banished from the courtroom because of his 
disability is limited in his work and segregated.  Subsection (b) also 
states that the term “discriminate” in subsection (a) “includes” the three 
specified actions.43  This language in the ADA44 appears to establish 
 
 37. Complainant’s Brief, supra note 36, at app. 41, 43-44. 
 38. See id. at 41-44. 
 39. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (2002). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), (5), and (7) (2003). 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2003).  
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1).  
 43. Id. 
 44. The United States Supreme Court has held that Congress did not validly 
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of damages actions 
based on Title I of the ADA.  Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001).  
However, Title I of the ADA is applicable in this case, which involves the potential 
discriminatory effect of an order of a state court judge.  The Supreme Court noted that 
“Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States” and that actions 
against public officials for prospective injunctive relief were still available.  Id.  The 
Court specifically stated: 
7
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what the Panel 15976 court stated, that the law clerk had a right to 
perform his job in the courtroom.45 
Another federal statute, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
outlaws discrimination on the basis of a person’s disability in programs 
that receive federal financial assistance.46 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the 
United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, 
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted 
by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal 
Service.47 
Section 504 would apply to the court’s action if the court system receives 
federal financial assistance.48  Assuming this federal financial assistance, 
a directive that a law clerk with a disability be excluded from the 
courtroom because of that disability would certainly appear to subject 
that law clerk to discrimination in terms of section 504.49 
The law clerk’s employment rights are also protected by Title II of 
the ADA, which proscribes discrimination on the basis of disability in 
public services by stating “no qualified individual with a disability shall, 
 
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign 
immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I 
does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against 
discrimination.  Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the 
States.  Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for 
money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive 
relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  In addition, state laws 
protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other 
aspects of life provide independent avenues of redress. 
Id. at 374 n.9. Based upon this footnote in the Garrett decision, the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, in Gibson v. Arkansas Department of Correction, 265 F.3d 718, 719-20 
(2001), held that state officials can be sued in their official capacity for injunctive relief 
under Title I of the ADA by using Ex parte Young. 
 45. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 457. 
 46. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2003). 
 47. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
 48. See id.  Unlike the ADA, an action effectively against the state under section 
504 is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  See Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 
1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that statutory abrogation of states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit under Rehabilitation Act, where the state received 
federal funds, was a proper exercise of Congress’ spending power).  Congress enacted 
section 504 under the Spending Power Clause of the Constitution.  Id.  The state, by 
accepting the federal largesse, waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Id. 
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2003). 
8
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by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”50  The Title 
II regulations prohibit discrimination by public entities in employment 
but incorporate the Title I standards.51  The analysis of the law clerk’s 
employment rights would be the same. Title II cases also involve 
physical access to a courthouse or a courtroom.52  While serving as a law 
clerk in the state district court, the law clerk in this case had physical 
access to the courthouse and the courtroom.53 
Of course, to prevail in any claim of discrimination the law clerk 
would have to establish that he is a “qualified individual with a 
disability.”54  It is undisputed that the law clerk had a severe disability55 
 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2003). 
 51. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (2002), provides: 
(a) No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, 
be subjected to discrimination in employment under any service, program, or 
activity conducted by a public entity. 
(b)(1) For purposes of this part, the requirements of title I of the Act, as 
established by the regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission in 29 CFR part 1630, apply to employment in any service, 
program, or activity conducted by a public entity if that public entity is also 
subject to the jurisdiction of title I. (2) For the purposes of this part, the 
requirements of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as established 
by the regulations of the Department of Justice in 28 CFR part 41, as those 
requirements pertain to employment, apply to employment in any service, 
program, or activity conducted by a public entity if that public entity is not 
also subject to the jurisdiction of title I. 
But see Filush v. Town of Weston, 266 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330-31 (D. Conn. 2003) 
(deeming 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 invalid because Congress did not intend for Title II to apply 
to employment). 
 52. Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2001); Keith v. Mullins, 162 F.3d 539 
(8th Cir. 1998); Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469 (8th Cir. 1998).  The question whether 
Congress lawfully abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title II cases 
is currently before the Supreme Court.  Tennessee v. Lane, 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003), 
cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2622 (2003). 
 53. He did not, however, have ready access to the supreme court chambers in the 
State Capitol to attend the argument in Panel Case No. 15976.  His attendant had to 
retrieve portable ramps from his van in order to get up the two marble steps that blocked 
his way. (Personal knowledge of the author.) 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2003). 
 55. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 454.  The court described him in these 
terms, “The clerk assigned by complainant to assist in this case is physically disabled. He 
is paralyzed from his mouth down and has difficulty breathing and speaking. He 
performed his duties as a law clerk with the assistance of a large wheelchair, respirator 
and full-time attendant.”  Id. 
9
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and was, therefore, a “qualified individual with a disability.”56  The trial 
judge testified that the law clerk was extremely capable.57  The court 
noted that the basis for the plaintiff’s motion was that “the law clerk’s 
demonstrated capability would diminish the client’s disability claim.”58 
The case for stating that an order barring the law clerk with a 
disability from the courtroom violates all of these statutes seems clear.  
That order would directly affect a qualified individual with a disability in 
the performance of the usual functions of his job solely because of that 
person’s disability.  If a law clerk in this situation were actually to sue, 
however, there is a serious question whether the courts would find that 
an order excluding the law clerk would violate these statutes. 
A.  Would an Order Prohibiting a Law Clerk with a Disability from 
Working in the Courtroom Be an Adverse Employment Action? 
The courts are often reluctant to find that actions by employers short 
of termination or reduction of pay or benefits fulfill the “adverse 
employment action” component of a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination, despite the broad language in both the MHRA59 and the 
ADA60 regarding terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.61  
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals limits these terms severely in 
actions under both the ADA and Title VII.62  The general standard is that 
 
 56. The ADA defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as: 
[A]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment 
position that such individual holds or desires.  For the purposes of this 
subchapter, consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to 
what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a 
written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, 
this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the 
job. 
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2003). 
 57. Complainant’s Brief, supra note 36, at app. 42; Record, supra note 36, at 17. 
 58. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d at 458. 
 59. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (2002). 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2003). 
 61. Cooney v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 258 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) (“To 
establish a prima facie treatment case . . . appellants had to show that they suffered an 
adverse employment action.”); Spears v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr. & Human Res., 210 F.3d 
850, 853-54 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 62. See, e.g., Burchett v. Target Corp., 340 F.3d 510, 518 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that failure to transfer disabled employee to a different department was not in violation of 
MHRA or ADA); Moisant v. Air Midwest, Inc., 291 F.3d 1028, 1031 (8th Cir. 2002); 
Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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the plaintiff must show a “tangible change in duties or working 
conditions that constituted a material employment disadvantage.”63  
Phrased differently, there must not simply be a change in the terms or 
conditions of employment, but a material change.64  In rather cavalier 
fashion, the courts state that “[n]ot everything that makes an employee 
unhappy is an actionable adverse employment action.”65 Rather, 
“[t]ermination, reduction in pay or benefits, and changes in employment 
that significantly affect an employee’s future career prospects meet this 
standard.”66  Adverse employment evaluations that have no direct impact 
on employment status are not actionable.67  Mere “inconvenience” is not 
enough.68  Lateral transfers that do not involve loss of pay, benefits, 
rank, or responsibility are not adverse employment actions.69  The Eighth 
Circuit has held that employer actions requiring an employee to move 
from Omaha to Denison, Iowa,70 or from St. Paul to Chicago71 are not 
adverse employment actions in retaliation cases.72  In Ledergerber v. 
 
 63. Burchett, 340 F.3d at 518 (quoting Moisant, 291 F.3d at 1031); see also Spears, 
210 F.3d at 854 (finding that the lowering of an officer’s performance evaluation was not 
an “adverse employment action”). 
 64. Jones v. Reliant Energy—ARKLA, 336 F.3d 689, 691 (8th Cir. 2003) (race 
discrimination under Title VII); Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 716-
17 (8th Cir. 2003) (ADA and MHRA); Brown v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 286 F.3d 
1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 2002) (ADA). 
 65. LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 240 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2001) (sex 
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII); see also Brown, 286 F.3d at 1045. 
 66. Jones, 336 F.3d at 691 (quoting Spears, 210 F.3d at 853). 
 67. Burchett, 340 F.3d at 518-19; see also LaCroix, 240 F.3d at 691-92 (finding 
moderately negative performance review to be insufficiently adverse). 
 68. Spears, 210 F.3d at 853 (retaliation under Title VII); accord Enowmbitang v. 
Seagate Tech., Inc., 148 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1998) (race and national origin 
discrimination under Title VII and MHRA). 
 69. Fenney, 327 F.3d at 717; Brown, 286 F.3d at 1045; LePique v. Hove, 217 F.3d 
1012, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 2000) (sexual harassment under Title VII). 
 70. Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 71. Hoffman v. Rubin, 193 F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1999).  In this Title VII 
retaliation case, the court stated: 
An adverse action occurs when an employee suffers some personal loss or 
harm with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Mr. 
Hoffman’s proposed transfer cannot be said to have caused him personal loss 
or harm, or disadvantage him in any way cognizable under Title VII. His 
rank, pay, and other benefits would not be changed. We acknowledge 
plaintiff’s contention that personnel and conditions in the Chicago office 
would be hostile to him. Such considerations, while hardly negligible on a 
personal level, are not concrete enough to trigger a Title VII claim. 
Id.  
 72. The Montandon and Hoffman decisions make no distinction between an adverse 
employment action in cases alleging discrimination and those cases claiming retaliatory 
11
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Stangler,73 the Eighth Circuit stated the rationale for these decisions by 
quoting a decision of the Seventh Circuit: “A transfer involving only 
minor changes in working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits 
will not constitute an adverse employment action, ‘otherwise every 
trivial personnel action that an irritable . . . employee did not like would 
form the basis of a discrimination suit.’ ”74 
There are exceptions, but they involve cases in which rather 
extraordinary action was taken, albeit short of termination or a reduction 
in pay.  Recently, in an ADA case, the Eighth Circuit noted that the 
adverse action “need not always involve termination or even a decrease 
in benefits or pay.”75  In that case, the court held that transfer of a 
surgical nurse to a clerical position in which she could not exercise her 
professional skill and worked in a room called the “dummy room” 
amounted to an adverse employment action.76  The limited number of 
Minnesota appellate court decisions on these issues often cite Eighth 
Circuit decisions, although the application of those standards may be less 
stringent.77 
The MHRA, the ADA, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act78 all 
 
action. 
 73. 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 74. Id. at 1144 (quoting Williams v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 
(7th Cir. 1966)). 
 75. Brown, 286 F.3d at 1045 (citing Phillips v. Collings, 256 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 
2001) (an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 charging discrimination and harassment on a 
religious basis)).  The court found that a fifty-three-page evaluation complete with 
corrective action plans and remedial training requirements was, in the context presented, 
an adverse employment action.  Id. 
 76. Brown, 286 F.3d at 1045-46. 
 77. Dietrich v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 536 N.W.2d 319 (Minn. 1995) is the only 
reported state appellate decision that addresses what constitutes an adverse employment 
action for purposes of a claim of discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.  
Not surprisingly, the court stated that “[i]t would defy logic to hold that a plaintiff who is 
unemployed because she is furloughed following a reduction-in-force has not suffered an 
adverse employment action for purposes of a proceeding under the MHRA.”  Id. at 325.  
In Cierzan v. Hamline University, No. C4-02-706, 2002 WL 31553931, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2002), the court applied the “materially alters the terms or conditions of 
employment” test in a case that arises under the MHRA.  In Mahazu v. Becklund Home 
Health Care, Inc., No. C8-02-28,  2002 WL 1751280, at * 4-*5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), 
the court applied the “material employment disadvantage” test in a whistleblower action 
under Minnesota Statutes section 181.932.  In another whistleblower action, Johnson v. 
Independent School District No. 118, No. CX-00-1998, 2001 WL 605081, at * 4 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2001), the court found that the proposed transfer of a bus aide from one school 
bus to another was not an adverse employment action. Id. (citing Hoffman v. Rubin, 193 
F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003). 
12
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proscribe discrimination in a broad range of employment actions, 
including discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.  Contrary to the decisions cited above, the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that this language in Title VII is not 
limited to “economic” or “tangible” discrimination, and that it covers 
more than “ ‘terms’ and ‘conditions’ in the narrow contractual sense.”79  
That Court has stated that Title VII demonstrates the intention of 
Congress to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms.80  But 
these statements were made in cases where the workplace was permeated 
with pervasive discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that 
created an abusive working environment.81 
The law clerk in this case was not faced with a hostile work 
environment in these terms.  Even if prohibited from being in the 
courtroom for a trial, he would still be employed, would suffer no 
diminution of pay or benefits, and would still use his professional skills.  
From that standpoint, there would be no adverse employment action, 
although the experience of being in court is, in many respects, one of the 
important benefits of a law clerk position.  Perhaps the case would be 
different if similar motions were granted in other personal injury cases 
during the course of the clerk’s tenure.  Considered alone, however, one 
order that prohibits a law clerk with a disability from being present in the 
courtroom during one case, even if explicitly based upon that law clerk’s 
disability, may not constitute an adverse employment action for purposes 
of a lawsuit based on the MHRA or ADA. 
B.  Would There Be Justification for the Discriminatory Action? 
The ADA provides a defense to employers who use selection 
criteria that tend to screen out or deny a job or a benefit of a job to a 
person with a disability—that those criteria are “job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.”82  Assuming that an order or ruling 
prohibiting a law clerk with a disability were challenged in an action 
under the ADA, the defense could be that the very presence of a law 
clerk with a severe disability in the courtroom would so prejudice the 
jury that the plaintiff could not get a fair trial.  This argument amounts to 
a claim that, for some personal injury trials, it is a bona fide occupational 
 
 79. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998). 
 80. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002). 
 81. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2003). 
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qualification (“BFOQ”) that law clerks not have a disability, or at least a 
visible one.  But the validity of this BFOQ can “only be ascertained 
when it is assessed in relationship to the business of the employer.”83  A 
primary purpose of the court system is to offer litigants a fair trial.  
Whether there is a reasonable basis to state that the law clerk’s presence 
actually threatens the plaintiff’s right to a fair trial requires more detailed 
consideration if obviously injured plaintiffs have been excluded from the 
courtroom. 
III. THE INTERESTS AND RIGHTS OF THE INJURED PLAINTIFF 
A.  The Plaintiff’s Interest and Right Is to Have a Fair Trial 
The plaintiff in this case had disabilities that were significant, but 
less severe than those of the court’s law clerk.84  He questioned whether 
it was possible to get a fair assessment of his injuries when the jury 
observed the law clerk working productively in the courtroom.85  His 
interest and his right is to a fair trial in which the jury would assess both 
liability and his damages on the basis of the evidence presented.  Unlike 
the law clerk, his interests and rights at this juncture do not arise under 
the ADA or the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of 
disability in the MHRA.86  His claim is similar to the claim of defendants 
 
 83. Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1528 (7th Cir. 
1988).  In Torres the court had to determine whether the “business” of a women’s 
maximum security prison was rehabilitation and to decide whether it was permissible to 
employ only female correctional officers in that facility. Id. at 1524. 
 84. See Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d 452, 454 (Minn. 2002) (noting plaintiff 
was able to walk with a cane, whereas the law clerk was paralyzed from the mouth down 
and used a wheelchair).  Plaintiff sustained “serious permanent physical injuries that 
disabled him when a school bus hit and ran over him with a rear tire while he was riding 
a bicycle in South Minneapolis.  Id.  The accident crushed his pelvis, and left him in a 
coma for approximately 1 month. By the time of trial, the [plaintiff] was able to walk 
with the assistance of a cane.”  Id. 
 85. Id.  The plaintiff’s employment potential was limited not only by his injuries but 
also by his employment background and experience: 
Before the accident, the client was employed as a checker and bagger at a grocery 
store and as a greeter at a restaurant. His employment background consisted of 
similar unskilled and physical labor positions. At trial, the client asserted that his 
permanent injuries prevented him from performing physical-labor-type jobs and 
that he did not qualify educationally or intellectually for other types of 
employment. Therefore, he sought damages for future loss of wages and future 
diminished earning capacity. 
Id. 
 86. The opinion of the court does not mention that the plaintiff was African-
14
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in personal injury actions who fear that the jury will be unfairly 
sympathetic at the sight of a severely injured plaintiff.  That claim, as 
will be discussed below, has a due process basis.  There are no reported 
cases in which a litigant seeks to bar a court employee with a disability 
from the courtroom to ensure a fair trial, but the principles established in 
the cases in which the defendant seeks to exclude an injured plaintiff 
from the courtroom provide a framework for discussion of the claim that 
the law clerk’s presence reduced the likelihood that the plaintiff would 
get a fair trial. 
B.  Basis in Law and Fact to Exclude Injured Plaintiffs from the 
Courtroom During a Jury Trial 
Some relatively early cases held that an injured plaintiff could not 
be barred from any portion of a trial.  The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in Chicago Great Western Railway Co. v. Beecher,87 held that a 
plaintiff younger than 3 years old, whose injuries were not described, 
could not be excluded from the courtroom during the trial.  The trial 
judge stated: “I know of no rule of law which authorizes the court to 
exclude plaintiff, defendant, or any litigant from the courtroom.”88  The 
Eighth Circuit acknowledged this lack of authority and summarily 
dismissed a challenge to that ruling.89 
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the argument that it 
was an error for a trial judge to permit the plaintiff to be brought into the 
courtroom on a stretcher in, according to the defendant, a “weak, 
sickened and stupified [sic] condition and attended by a nurse and a 
hospital attendant.”90  That court stated: 
We think this point is wholly without merit.  One who 
institutes an action is entitled to be present when it is tried.  
That, we think, is a right that should not be tempered by the 
physical condition of the litigant.  It would be strange, indeed, 
to promulgate a rule that a plaintiff’s right to appear at his own 
trial would depend on his personal attractiveness, or that he 
could be excluded from the courtroom if he happened to be 
 
American.  Before the motion for a mistrial was made, the plaintiff expressed to his 
counsel his concern that the jury and all the court officers were white.  Transcript, Panel 
Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. 2002) (Nos. C6-02-139 and C3-02-227) at 39-
41, Complainant’s Brief, supra note 36, at app. 66-68. 
 87. 150 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1945). 
 88. Id. at 399. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Fla. Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1952). 
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unsightly from injuries which he was trying to prove the 
defendant negligently caused.91 
The court added that if the use of the stretcher “affected” the trial, the 
court could act to prevent the jury from being deceived by the 
“subterfuge.”92  This analysis was approved in a New York decision that 
reversed a trial court ruling that barred a plaintiff with paraplegia who 
used a wheelchair from the courtroom while the jury was being 
selected.93  The court stated that “a judicial determination that the 
physical appearance of a party, which he has not affected, may be the 
basis for precluding such party from any stage of a trial, is fraught with 
danger in its implications.”94 
A federal district judge in Louisiana denied a motion for a remittitur 
of a $2 million verdict for an extremely badly burned child who was 
present in the courtroom.95  The court stated: 
The defendants suggest that the presence of the child in the 
courtroom and in the corridors of the courthouse in some way 
inflamed or prejudiced the jury.  This allegation is unfounded; 
the defendants have not pointed out any wrongful conduct on 
the part of Helen Britain [the child], her parents, or counsel for 
plaintiffs.  Helen Britain was well behaved and quiet the entire 
time she was in the courtroom.  Accordingly I hold that there 
was not any bias, prejudice, or any other improper influence 
which motivated the jury in making its award.96 
Nothing in these reported decisions suggests that there was or had 
been a request for a bifurcated trial of liability and damages issues.  
Where damages, but not liability, are at issue, the courts uniformly allow 
the plaintiff to be present in the courtroom.  The courts follow differing 
rules when a request is made to exclude an injured plaintiff from the 
courtroom for the liability phase of a trial.97 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Carlisle v. Nassau County, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), 
appeal dismissed, 45 N.Y.2d 965 (1978). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136, 141 (E.D. La. 1974). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Compare Dickson v. Bober, 269 Minn. 334, 337-38, 130 N.W.2d 526, 530 
(1964) (holding that injured plaintiff had no right to be present when liability was 
litigated because he could not contribute to or understand the proceeding and his rights 
were protected by his legal guardian and his attorney) and Morley v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 
638 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ariz. 1981) (concluding that the comatose plaintiff was properly 
precluded from appearing in front of the jury during the liability phase due to his inability 
to assist in the presentation of his case) with Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 205 
16
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In a leading case, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff 
who could neither contribute evidence on the question of fault nor 
comprehend the proceedings had no right to be in the courtroom when 
liability was litigated.98  Dickson v. Bober involved a young man injured 
in a motorcycle accident.99  He was unable to express himself, helpless, 
entirely dependent upon others, and wholly unable to comprehend the 
trial proceedings.100  The trial judge excluded him from the courtroom 
after observing that “[h]is eyes seemed to function on detection of an 
unusual movement,” that “[h]ideous and agonizing groans and sounds 
emanated” from him, and that he would present a “depressing spectacle” 
before the jury.101  After a verdict for the defendant, the trial judge 
ordered a new trial because the plaintiff was precluded from appearing 
before the jury.102  The court reversed, stating that “the determination of 
whether a plaintiff unable by reason of his injuries to contribute to or 
understand the trial proceedings should be permitted, nevertheless, to 
attend the trial must rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.”103  
The court also suggested that to bifurcate the trial would allow a plaintiff 
whose appearance is relevant to the issue of damages to be present for 
that portion of the trial.104 
The Arizona Supreme Court adopted the Dickson analysis in Morley 
v. Superior Court of Arizona,105 a case involving a comatose plaintiff.  
The court stated: 
A plaintiff unable to at least communicate with counsel will 
have no right denied by exclusion from the courtroom during 
the liability phase of the trial.  If in addition the plaintiff’s 
physical condition, allegedly caused by the defendant, is so 
pitiable that the trial court determines the plaintiff’s mere 
presence would prejudice the jury, then failure to exclude the 
plaintiff during the liability phase would deny the defendant’s 
right to an unbiased jury when the source of the bias is totally 
 
(Okla. 1997) (holding physical appearance alone does not justify exclusion from the 
courtroom) and Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, 785 A.2d 361, 364 (Md. 2001) 
(excluding a severely brain damaged plaintiff from the liability phase of the trial because 
of the prejudicial effect on the jury). 
 98. Dickson, 269 Minn. at 337-38, 130 N.W.2d at 530. 
 99. Id. at 336, 130 N.W.2d at 529. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 337, 130 N.W.2d at 530. 
 104. Id. at 337-38, 130 N.W.2d at 530. 
 105. 638 P.2d 1331 (Ariz. 1981). 
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irrelevant to the liability issue.106 
The court added that bifurcation would permit the plaintiff to be 
present during the damages portion of the trial and thus “prove damages 
by the most direct evidence available—the plaintiff’s own physical 
condition.”107  The Sixth Circuit reviewed these cases and provided an 
analytical framework, which has been followed in many subsequent 
cases, to decide when an injured plaintiff should be excluded from the 
courtroom.108  Based on Carlisle v. Nassau County,109 Florida 
Greyhound Lines v. Jones,110 and Purvis v. Inter-County Telephone & 
Telegraph Co.,111 the court held that a plaintiff’s physical condition 
alone does not warrant exclusion from the courtroom during any phase of 
the proceeding.112  Based on Dickson, Morley, and the court’s conclusion 
that any exclusion from the trial must be consistent with due process, the 
court held that “a plaintiff who can comprehend the proceedings and aid 
counsel may not be excluded from any portion of the proceedings absent 
disruptive behavior or a knowing and voluntary waiver.”113 
The court held that, while jury sympathy alone would not establish 
jury prejudice, “there may be occasions when the mere presence of a 
party would render the jury unable to arrive at an unbiased judgment 
concerning liability.”114  The court based this holding on the fundamental 
principle that the court has an obligation to ensure that a case is decided 
on the evidence presented rather than emotional factors.115  To resolve 
that issue, Helminski held that there must be a hearing in which the 
defendant has the burden to establish that the plaintiff’s presence would 
prevent or impair the jury’s performance of its fact-finding task.116  The 
 
 106. Id. at 1334. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985). Helminski was a 
products liability case brought by parents on behalf of their minor son, Hugh, claiming 
that he was harmed by in utero exposure to a surgical anesthetic while his mother worked 
as a registered nurse anesthetist.  Hugh was 17 years old when the case was tried.  The 
case was bifurcated late in the proceedings when plaintiff’s counsel indicated that he was 
going to call Hugh as a witness.  Id. 
 109. 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). 
 110. 60 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1952). 
 111. 203 So. 2d 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 210 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 
1968) (noting that Greyhound Lines precludes the exclusion of the plaintiff from 
courtroom on the basis of physical appearance). 
 112. Helminski, 766 F.2d at 215. 
 113. Id. at 216-17. 
 114. Id at 217. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
18
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court cautioned, again, that physical appearance alone is not the test, 
rather “the requisite showing of prejudice cannot be satisfied simply by 
establishing that a plaintiff has a physical or mental injury; the party 
seeking exclusion must establish that the party’s appearance or conduct 
is likely to prevent the jury from performing its duty.”117  If the court 
decides that the party’s mere presence would be prejudicial, then the 
court must consider whether “the party can comprehend the proceedings 
and assist counsel in any meaningful way.”118  If so, regardless of 
prejudicial impact, the party cannot be involuntarily excluded.119  The 
Sixth Circuit held that the district court improperly excluded the 17-year-
old plaintiff, whose physical appearance was normal, without observing 
him, but on the basis of his described condition alone:120 
Although testimony indicated that Hugh was not toilet trained, 
could not speak, comprehend the proceedings, or assist 
counsel, and sometimes emitted frightening sounds, this 
description is insufficient to establish that the jury would be 
prevented from or substantially impaired in performing its 
duty.  The analysis absent in this case would focus on the 
likelihood of Hugh displaying abnormal behavior and the 
likelihood of this conduct affecting the jury’s ability to decide 
the case on the facts.121 
The court does not specify how a display of abnormal behavior would 
affect the jury’s ability to decide the case on the facts.122 
Several months before Helminski was decided, the company that 
produced a drug that allegedly caused birth defects moved the federal 
court in the Southern District of Ohio to exclude injured children from 
the courtroom during the trial of causation issues.123  The court ordered 
that “no child under the age of 10 and no child with visible birth defects, 
 
 117. Id. at 218. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  The trial was not bifurcated until after the testimony of the plaintiff’s final 
witness when plaintiff’s counsel announced his intention to call Hugh as his witness.  See 
id. at 212.  His mother and brother had described him in their testimony.  See id. at 212-
13. 
 121. Id. at 218.  Although the record did not establish a basis to say that Hugh’s 
presence at trial on the liability issue would be prejudicial, the court held that his absence 
was not reversible error because Hugh was completely unable to comprehend the 
proceedings or assist counsel in the case.  See id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See In re Richardson-Merril, Inc. “Bendectin” Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 
1212, 1222-24 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff’d sub nom. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 
322-23 (6th Cir. 1988) (involving a total of 818 cases). 
19
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regardless of age” would be permitted in the courtroom.124  In support of 
that order, the court stated that the children would not be able to 
understand the expert testimony, that display of the children’s birth 
defects was “irrelevant to the issue of causation,” and that large numbers 
of children in the courtroom “present a serious potential for distraction 
and disruption.”125  A separate courtroom was to be set aside in which 
children and adults (presumably their parents) could watch proceedings 
on closed-circuit television.126  After a verdict for the defendant on 
liability, the court applied the Helminski analysis in denying a motion for 
a new trial.127  With regard to the first issue—whether prejudice was 
established—the court stated: 
It is clear that the presence at trial during the liability phase of 
children suffering from severe visible birth defects is 
inherently prejudicial.  There is no more protected and beloved 
member of human society than a helpless newborn infant.  
Conversely, it has become fashionable to castigate and punish 
that depersonalized segment of society identified variously as 
“big business,” “soulless corporations,” or “industrial 
complex.”  If the battle is emotional alone, between newborn 
infants and big business, there can be but one winner. 
Emotional battles, however, should not be staged in the federal 
courtroom.  We deal in liability imposed not by emotion but by 
law.  It is customary, in fact, to instruct juries that “[a]ll 
persons including corporations are entitled to a fair trial.  The 
law is no respector of persons.”128 
The court concluded that the “unfair prejudicial effect” of the presence of 
a deformed child in the courtroom on trial of the liability issue was 
“beyond calculation.”129 
The Bendectin case, which involved hundreds of children, was 
atypical.  Most cases involve a single plaintiff, often a child.  In these 
cases, nevertheless, courts often find the requisite prejudice to bar the 
plaintiff from the courtroom.  In a North Dakota case on behalf of a child 
alleged to have suffered brain injury at birth, the court held that it was 
not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to exclude the child from the 
courtroom during the liability phase of the trial because her “pathetic” 
 
 124. In re Richardson-Merril, Inc., 624 F. Supp. at 1271 (Appendix E). 
 125. Id. at 1270. 
 126. Id. at 1271. 
 127. Id. at 1249. 
 128. Id. at 1224 (quoting Appendix D at 1266). 
 129. Id. 
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appearance would be a “distraction.”130  In a similar case in Oregon, the 
trial court refused to allow the jury to view the plaintiff child for a brief 
period during the liability phase of the trial because the child could not 
meaningfully participate in the trial and the sole reason would be to 
prejudice the jury.131  No formal hearing was held, but the Oregon 
Supreme Court stated that detailed testimony about the child’s condition, 
including the fact that he experienced eight to twelve seizures a day, and 
the allegations in the complaint that he had mental retardation and spastic 
quadriplegia provided ample basis for the trial court to determine that his 
presence in the courtroom might have caused the jury to decide liability 
on an improper, emotional basis.132  The 20-year-old plaintiff in Green v. 
North Arundel Hospital Ass’n, Inc.,133 who had been severely brain-
damaged almost a decade earlier,134 was excluded from the liability 
phase of the trial.135  The trial judge watched a videotape of the young 
man’s day, which showed that he was virtually motionless except for 
some eye blinking and some movement during suctioning or changing 
his feeding tube.136  The trial judge recognized that this man could not be 
excluded from the courtroom solely on the basis of his physical 
appearance, but found that the burden to justify his exclusion from the 
liability phase of the trial had been met and that the prejudice from his 
presence would extend beyond “any instructions that could be 
offered.”137 
The cases just discussed strongly suggest that prejudice was actually 
presumed from the physical appearance of the plaintiffs.138  They also 
strongly suggest that the paramount concern was whether the plaintiffs 
could understand the proceedings and provide any assistance to their 
counsel.139  If they could not, then the burden of showing prejudice was 
relatively slight. 
 
 130. Reems v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 536 N.W.2d 666, 668-69 (N.D. 
1995). 
 131. Bremner v. Charles, 821 P.2d 1080, 1084, 1086 (Or. 1991). 
 132. Id. at 1086. 
 133. 785 A.2d 361 (Md. 2001). 
 134. Id. at 364-65. 
 135. Id. at 378. 
 136. Id. at 381. 
 137. Id. at 371. 
 138. See Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 785 A.2d 361, 363. (Md. 2001); 
Reems v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. and Health Ctr., 536 N.W.2d 666, 669 (N.D. 1995); 
Bremner v. Charles, 821 P.2d  1080, 1086 (Or. 1991). 
 139. See Green, 785 A.2d at 363; Reems, 536 N.W.2d at 669; Bremner, 821 P.2d at 
1086. 
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court adheres more closely to the 
principles that physical appearance alone cannot justify exclusion from 
the courtroom and that the possibility of juror sympathy alone is not jury 
prejudice.140  The Oklahoma case involved a boy, 6 years old at the time 
of trial, who was severely burned when he was 3 years old.141  The trial 
judge bifurcated the trial, and stated unequivocally that the child would 
be excluded from the courtroom “because he’s scarred so badly I think it 
would be unfairly prejudicial.”142  The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
disagreed.  That court referred both to Article 2, Section 6 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution, which states that the “courts of justice of the 
State shall be open to every person,” and to the due process basis for the 
Helminski decision.143  Although the court found no absolute right for a 
party to be present in the courtroom, the court held that “[a] party’s 
physical appearance cannot be the sole basis for exclusion from the 
courtroom, and does not amount to an ‘extreme circumstance’ permitting 
exclusion.”144  The court also concluded that a child his age would likely 
have “some understanding of the basic events of the trial as they occur, 
and there is nothing in the record to the contrary.”145  This court clearly 
rejected the assumption that jury sympathy is the equivalent of prejudice: 
“Rather than assuming the jury will be prejudiced by a physically scarred 
plaintiff, this holding aligns us with those courts which repose trust in the 
jury.”146 
Indiana likewise now requires either waiver or a showing of 
“extraordinary circumstances” to justify exclusion of a party from the 
courtroom, including the liability phase of a trial.147  The Jordan court 
based this holding on the state constitutional right to a jury trial in civil 
cases.148  The court held that the Helminski test announced in Gage v. 
Bozarth149 was not sufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s right to attend 
 
 140. Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 204 (Okla. 1997). 
 141. Id. at 202. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 203 (citing Helminski v. Alyerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
 144. Id. at 204. 
 145. Id. at 205. 
 146. Id. Four members of the court dissented.  Justice Opala stated, citing the 
Bendectin case quoted supra, that in “every trial in which corporate defendants stand 
pitted against children, the jury might easily be swayed in favor of an underage person 
whose countenance is so seriously disfigured.”  Id. at 214 (Opala, J., dissenting). 
 147. Jordan ex rel Jordan v. Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264, 1272 (Ind. 2002). 
 148. Id. (citing IND. CONST. Art. I, § 20). 
 149. 505 N.E.2d 64, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), overruled by Jordan ex rel Jordan v. 
Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 2002) (finding consistent with Helminski, that the plaintiff, 
who is confined to a wheelchair and dependent upon a ventilator, was unable to 
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her own trial.150  The court refused “to articulate a ‘bright-line rule’ to 
determine what are ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ ”151  The dissent 
observed, “if this case does not present extraordinary circumstances, 
except for incarcerated litigants it seems that no circumstances could 
meet this test.”152  According to the court, the record shows: 
Shelamiah suffers from cerebral palsy in all four extremities 
and Erb’s palsy in the left arm, cannot talk, makes involuntary 
movements and sounds, is sight impaired, and walks with the 
use of braces and a walker . . . . There is a dispute as to 
whether Shelamiah can understand the proceedings and 
communicate with counsel with the use of a laptop 
computer.153 
This plaintiff, 11 years old at the time of the trial, appears to be quite 
similar to the plaintiffs in other cases discussed above.  The difference, 
according to the court, is that she would be denied what the court found 
to be a “basic and fundamental” right to be present throughout the 
trial.154 
These plaintiff exclusion cases establish at least three principles 
relevant to the case of a law clerk with a disability.  The first principle is 
that the burden is on the party claiming prejudice to establish the bases 
for excluding a person with a disability from the courtroom.155  The 
second principle is that the plaintiff is entitled to be present if there is a 
constitutional right to do so.156  There may be disagreement whether 
there is an applicable constitutional right.  There appears to be no 
disagreement that if there is such a right, that right prevails even if the 
plaintiff’s presence might have a substantial impact on a liability issue 
for which the plaintiff’s physical condition or appearance is irrelevant.157 
The third principle relates to the second principle.  Dickson, Morley, 
 
understand the proceedings and to assist counsel). 
 150. Jordan, 778 N.E.2d at 1266. 
 151. Id. at 1272 n.8. 
 152. Id. at 1272 (Boehm, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 1266 n.3. 
 154. Id. at 1272. 
 155. Helminski v. Alyerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 217 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a 
plaintiff who could assist counsel had a due process right to be present during the liability 
phase of a trial). 
 156. Id. at 218; Cary v. Oneok, 940 P.2d 201, 213-13 (Okla. 1997) (holding based on 
both an Oklahoma state constitutional right and on due process); see also Jordan, 778 
N.E.2d at 1272 (clearly finding that the state constitutional right to a jury trial tips the 
balance in favor of the plaintiff’s presence in court). 
 157. See, e.g., Jordan, 778 N.E.2d at 1276 (finding the constitutional right to be 
present overcomes potential prejudice). 
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Helminski, and all of the subsequent cases agree that a plaintiff who can 
assist counsel is entitled to be in court throughout the liability phase of a 
trial even if the plaintiff’s appearance would otherwise be deemed 
unfairly prejudicial. 158  In short, if the plaintiff has some purpose or 
function to fulfill during the trial, the plaintiff cannot be excluded.159  
Ironically, if the law clerk in this case were the plaintiff in a personal 
injury action, this principle establishes that he would be entitled to 
remain in the courtroom throughout the trial. 
IV. THE OBLIGATION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO PROTECT 
THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE LAW CLERK WITH A DISABILITY 
AND THE INJURED PLAINTIFF 
The trial judge, faced with a motion to exclude his law clerk from 
the courtroom because of that law clerk’s disability, has obligations that 
parallel the rights and interests of both the law clerk and the plaintiff.  
The very purpose of a trial is to ensure that both parties receive a fair 
hearing.  The rules governing civil litigation state at the outset that the 
purpose is to ensure a fair process that leads to a just determination.160  
One essential component of a fair trial is “a jury capable and willing to 
decide the case solely on the evidence before it.”161  The court must 
protect that interest of both parties. 
The court also has an obligation to protect the interest of the law 
clerk that he is not discriminated against on the basis of disability.  That 
obligation arises, in part, from the very basic standards in the Code of 
Judicial Conduct that a judge must “respect and comply with the law” 
and “be faithful to the law . . . .”162  This obligation should apply to 
actions that regard court employees as well as to litigants before the 
court.  The public as a whole, as well as the law clerk with a disability, 
 
 158. Allen P. Grunes, Exclusion of Plaintiffs from the Courtroom in Personal Injury 
Actions: A Matter of Discretion or Constitutional Right? 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 
397 (1998). Grunes identified several functions the plaintiff could serve during the trial 
including an educative role (informing counsel of salient facts or issues), a strategic role 
(discussing tactics with counsel), and what he termed a moral role (deterring untruthful 
testimony by the opposing party).  Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . shall be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”); MINN. R. EVID. 
102 (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration . . . to the end 
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”). 
 161. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554, (1984) 
(quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)). 
 162. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canons 2A and 3A(2) (2002). 
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can reasonably expect that judges will comply with state and federal laws 
that prohibit discrimination on all the bases specified in those statutes. 
Beyond an obligation to comply with the law in general, however, 
both the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Minnesota Rules of Practice 
prohibit discriminatory actions by trial judges.  Canon 3A(5) requires a 
judge to “perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.”163  That 
Canon states: 
A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by 
words or conduct manifest  bias or prejudice, including but not 
limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, 
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or 
socioeconomic status, and shall not permit court personnel and 
others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so. 164 
A judge who may not permit his law clerk to exhibit bias or prejudice 
should not discriminate against that law clerk on the basis of disability.  
Canon 3A(6) addresses the issue in terms applicable to the motion for a 
mistrial, but begs the answer to the question: 
A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge 
to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or 
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, 
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, in 
relation to parties, witnesses, counsel or others.  This Section 
3A(6) does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, 
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or 
socioeconomic status, or other similar factors, are issues in the 
proceeding.165 
The Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the district courts include 
similar requirements for both the court and counsel.  Rule 2.02(a) 
includes this requirement, “[t]he judge shall at all times treat all lawyers, 
jury members, and witnesses fairly and shall not discriminate on the 
basis of race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, 
sexual preference, status with regard to public assistance, disability, or 
age.166  Rule 2.03(d) includes a similar standard of conduct for 
attorneys.167 
 
 163. Id. at Canon 3A(5). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at Canon 3A(6). 
 166. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 2.02(a). 
 167. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 2.03(d).  The rule reads: 
Lawyers shall treat all parties, participants, other lawyers, and court 
personnel fairly and shall not discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed, 
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The court’s obligation in this apparent conflict of interest between 
the plaintiff and the law clerk is to be “faithful to the law.”168  Both the 
law clerk and the injured plaintiff ordinarily have a right to be in the 
courtroom, the plaintiff to attend the trial of his case and the law clerk to 
do his job.  The cases discussed above state that an injured plaintiff 
should not be excluded from the liability portion of a trial on the basis of 
appearance alone.  Similarly, the law clerk should not be excluded from 
the courtroom on the basis of his evident disabilities unless there is some 
additional basis to establish prejudice to the plaintiff. 
The cases discussed above require that a defendant who seeks to bar 
a plaintiff from the liability phase of a trial has the burden of showing 
that it would be unfair or prejudicial to allow the injured plaintiff in the 
courtroom.  How prejudice is established is not clearly explained.  Two 
suggested bases for establishing prejudice are that the plaintiffs will 
distract the jury either by their appearance or by their behavior,169 or that 
the plaintiff’s appearance will prompt an emotional response by the jury 
rather than a rational consideration of the evidence.170  In this case, even 
if some members of the jury feel sympathetic to the law clerk, there is no 
reason that this sympathy would prejudice the jury against the plaintiff to 
the extent that observation of children with birth defects might prejudice 
a drug company.  It is speculative to suggest that jurors will grant less 
damages to an injured plaintiff because there is somebody with manifest 
disabilities working in the courtroom.  Indeed, the speculation could run 
 
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, sexual preference, status with 
regard to public assistance, disability or age.  
Id. 
 168. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3A(2) (2002). 
 169. Morley v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 638 P. 2d 1331,1334 (Ariz. 1981) (stating that 
even during the damages phase of the trial the plaintiff might be kept out of the 
courtroom if his “presence becomes disruptive to the conduct of the trial”); Green v. N. 
Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 785 A.2d 361, 370 n.4. (Md. 2001) (noting that the trial court 
might have been concerned with “the disruptive effect of suctioning his air tube—the 
noise and jerking movement that the court observed on the video”). 
 170. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., “Bendectin” Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 
1212, 1222-23 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (“Trial attorneys do not seek an impartial jury.  They 
seek a sympathetic jury.”); Bremner v. Charles, 821 P.2d  1080, 1086 (Or. 1991) 
(“[Plaintiff’s] presence in the courtroom during the liability phase of the bifurcated trial 
may have caused the jury to decide the question of liability on an improper basis, i.e. an 
emotional one.”); Morley, 638 P.2d at 1333 (“[H]is presence would only prejudice the 
jury by evoking sympathy for him.”); Caputo v. Joseph J. Sarcona Trucking Co., Inc., 
611 N.Y.S.2d 655, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“[plaintiff’s] presence in the courtroom 
would have impaired the jury’s ability to objectively perform its task because he 
physically appeared to be in a state of unawareness”). 
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the other way. 
Even if there were some rational basis for the claim that the jury 
members will be swayed to the detriment of the plaintiff’s damages 
award by the law clerk’s presence, the cases discussed above hold that 
the injured plaintiff may not be excluded from the courtroom so long as 
he or she serves some purpose in the courtroom, including the ability to 
confer with counsel.  The law clerk, who serves several functions in the 
courtroom, should likewise not be excluded.  The law clerk also has a 
right under state and federal law to work in a courtroom setting if 
qualified to do so.  Just as the injured plaintiff’s due process rights (or 
state constitutional rights) should not be abridged because the jury might 
be swayed by the plaintiff’s appearance, the law clerk’s rights under the 
MHRA and the ADA should not be abridged on the speculative basis that 
the jury will disobey instructions to decide the case, including damages, 
upon the basis of the evidence presented. 
The employment discrimination cases discussed above indicate that 
an isolated instance in which a law clerk is prevented from working in 
the courtroom because of that law clerk’s disability may not constitute an 
actionable adverse employment action under either the MHRA or the 
ADA.  If such a case were presented, hopefully the courts would not 
characterize a deliberately discriminatory action taken in a court of law 
as a “mere inconvenience” or dismiss that action as another example of a 
personnel action that makes an irritable employee unhappy.  The issue is 
not whether the employer was evenhanded in allocating computers.171  
The mistrial motion in this case sought deliberate discrimination by the 
presiding officer in a court of law.  If in fact it was the intent of Congress 
to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms, and the language 
of both Title VII and the ADA does that, then an order or ruling that 
excludes a court employee from the courtroom simply because that 
employee had an evident disability should be an actionable adverse 
employment action. 
Whether or not the law clerk has a viable action under the ADA or 
the MHRA, that order or ruling would be inconsistent with the Code of 
Judicial Conduct and, in Minnesota, the Rules of Practice in the district 
courts.172  Those standards reflect what the courts ought to be—places 
where discrimination against members of protected classes does not 
occur.  That point was made in two decisions of the United States 
 
 171. See Enowmbitang v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 148 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 172. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 2A and 3A(2); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 202(a) and 203(d). 
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Supreme Court in cases involving the use of peremptory challenges.173 
In Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court held that private 
litigants may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the 
basis of race.174  The Court concluded that use of peremptory challenges 
on the basis of race could require potential jurors “to be put at risk of 
open and public discrimination as a condition of their participation in the 
justice system.”175  Justice Kennedy added: 
Finally, we note that the injury caused by the discrimination is 
made more severe because the government permits it to occur 
within the courthouse itself.  Few places are a more real 
expression of the constitutional authority of the government 
than a courtroom, where the law itself unfolds.  Within the 
courtroom, the government invokes its laws to determine the 
rights of those who stand before it.  In full view of the public, 
litigants press their cases, witnesses give testimony, juries 
render verdicts, and judges act with the utmost care to ensure 
that justice is done.176 
Three years later the Court held that intentional discrimination on 
the basis of gender in the use of peremptory strikes also violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.177  Once again the Court noted the impact of 
this action on the integrity of the judicial system: 
Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of 
justice is fundamental to our democratic system. It not only 
furthers the goals of the jury system.  It reaffirms the promise 
of equality under the law—that all citizens, regardless of race, 
ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to take part directly in our 
democracy.  When persons are excluded from participation in 
our democratic processes solely because of race or gender, this 
promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial 
system is jeopardized.178 
Although the Court made no reference to disability in this statement,179 
 
 173. Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628-30 (1991); J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 145-48 (1994). 
 174. Edmondson, 500 U.S. at 618-19. 
 175. Id. at 628. 
 176. Id. 
 177. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 130-31. 
 178. Id. at 145-46 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 179. It is highly improbable that the Court will extend these rulings to exclude 
peremptory strikes based on disability.  At an early point in the opinion, the Court stated 
that litigants may “exercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the venire any 
group or class of individuals normally subject to ‘rational basis’ review.”  Id. at 143.  The 
Court cited Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985), which held 
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there is no reason to say that discrimination on the basis of disability is 
ever acceptable in our courts. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court was right.  The court employee with 
a disability did have a right to perform his job in the courtroom and the 
motion for a mistrial based on his presence was indeed inappropriate.180  
The court was also right to state that “[n]either race nor disability should 
be used as a means of limiting participation in our courts.”181  The court 
failed, however, to characterize discrimination on the basis of disability 
as “inherently serious.”  The court could have stated forcefully, but did 
not, that when discrimination on the basis of disability occurs within the 
courtroom, the promise of equality dims within the courtroom and, in the 
instance of this case, in the legal profession. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 1993, in Panel File 98-26, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted 
that its Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System recognized that 
the justice system found itself “used as a powerful tool of the pervasive 
prejudice and the subtle, often elaborately camouflaged discrimination 
that still deeply scars our national life.”182  In 2003, a decade after that 
task force report, the number of African-American partners at the largest 
law firms in Minneapolis and St. Paul could “be counted on two hands, a 
situation almost unchanged from a decade ago.”183  The legal profession 
has had and still has an “inherently serious” problem in the employment 
of African-Americans.184 
 
that a rational basis test, not a strict scrutiny test, applies to determine whether a 
particular action that affects a person because that person has a disability violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.  There is no reasonable likelihood that this ruling will be 
changed.  In any event, in many cases potential jurors with disabilities might be excluded 
for cause. 
 180. See Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. 2002). 
 181. Id. at 456. 
 182. Panel File 98-26, 597 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Minn. 1999) (quoting MINNESOTA 
SUPREME COURT, TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 5 
(1993)). 
 183. Deborah Caulfield, Limited Partnerships, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 9, 
2003, at D1. 
 184. This article cannot encompass a complete discussion of all issues relating to 
discrimination in the legal profession.  Gender discrimination continues as well. While 
women associates are being hired at roughly the same rate as men, the great majority of 
partners in private firms are male and male attorneys are more highly compensated than 
women. WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION COMMITTEE, MINNESOTA STATE BAR 
ASSOCIATION, SELF-AUDIT FOR GENDER EQUITY (SAGE): SURVEY OF PRIVATE LAW FIRMS 
1995-2000, at Conclusion (Oct. 22, 2002). 
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The legal profession has had and still has a serious problem in 
hiring and employment of persons with disabilities.  In 1999, the 
Disability Subcommittee of the Hennepin County Bar Association 
Diversity Committee issued a Report and Model Guidelines for the 
Integration of Attorneys and Law Students with Disabilities into the 
Legal Profession.  The subcommittee concluded “that people with 
disabilities have been discriminatorily excluded from full participation in 
the legal profession.”185  The subcommittee based this conclusion in part 
on nationwide surveys that consistently showed “that attorneys with 
disabilities, despite their qualifications, are greatly disadvantaged in the 
job market, and that their starting salaries are lower than those of their 
non-disabled colleagues statewide.”186  The subcommittee also quoted 
local attorneys who reported discrimination in hiring.187  One respondent 
to a survey conducted by the subcommittee stated: “Once my disability 
was revealed, the tone of the interview changed dramatically from 
friendly to suspicious of me.”188 
Nationwide survey data confirm the experience of attorneys with 
disabilities in Hennepin County and throughout Minnesota.  The 
National Association for Law Placement surveys law graduates and 
reports on their employment status and salaries.  These surveys establish 
that only a small number of law graduates report they have a disability.189  
From 2000 to 2002, the percentage of law graduates with a disability 
employed in full-time legal work, or work for which bar passage was 
required, has ranged from 13% to 18% lower than the percentage for all 
law graduates.190  For all types of work, the percentage of graduates who 
have a disability who are employed has been 8% less than the percentage 
of all graduates.191  Median starting salaries reported by law graduates 
 
 185. DIVERSITY COMMITTEE DISABILITY SUBCOMMITTEE, HENNEPIN COUNTY BAR 
ASSOCIATION, REPORT AND MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE INTEGRATION OF ATTORNEYS AND 
LAW STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES INTO THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2 (May 1999) 
[hereinafter REPORT AND GUIDELINES]. 
 186. Id. at 4. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
189.   For the classes of 2000, 2001, and 2002, “employment status” was reported as of 
mid-February of the following year for 427, 387, and 411 law graduates with a disability, 
respectively, out of a total of more than 30,000 graduates.  NALP, Jobs & J.D.’s, 
Employment and Salaries of New Law Graduates, Class of 2000, at 45; NALP, Jobs & 
J.D.’s, Employment and Salaries of New Law Graduates, Class of 2001, at 45; NALP, 
Jobs & J.D.’s, Employment and Salaries of New Law Graduates, Class of 2002, at 47. 
 190. Id. 
191.   Id. 
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with a disability remained static at $46,000 to $47,000 from 2000 to 
2002, while median salaries for all graduates increased from $51,900 to 
$60,000 during that period.192 
Discrimination on the basis of disability in our judicial system has 
not received the scrutiny given to discrimination, also very real, on the 
basis of race and gender. Despite the evident disparity between the rate 
of employment and compensation of lawyers with disabilities and 
lawyers who do not have disabilities, studies and reports on diversity in 
the legal profession frequently do not focus on or even address 
employment of lawyers with a disability.193  The National Association 
for Law Placement (“NALP”) and the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”) recently undertook “a comprehensive study of judicial 
clerkships as employment opportunities for law graduates.”194  NALP 
and the ABA were motivated by “several critical concerns about 
clerkships and diversity in the legal profession.”195  Nevertheless, the 
word “disability” occurs only once in the “Executive Summary and 
Action Plan,” in a statement that had nothing to do with students with 
disabilities but rather discussed reasons students gave, or not, for seeking 
a clerkship with a particular judge.196  As might be expected in a report 
motivated in part by concerns about diversity among law clerks, the 
judiciary portion of the Action Plan included a recommendation that the 
courts seek to employ a diverse group of law clerks.197  The report states, 
“[t]he judiciary is encouraged to join many other organizations who have 
embraced the goal of diversity in background, experience, race, ethnicity, 
 
192. Id. The number of law graduates with a disability reporting salary information 
was small: only 213 for the class of 2000, 191 for the class of 2001, and 183 for the class 
of 2002.  NALP, Class of 2000, at 18, 60; NALP, Class of 2001, at 18, 58; NALP, Class 
of 2002, at 18, 60.  
 193. The Hennepin County Bar Association’s report is an exception, as is the report 
from the San Francisco Bar Association on which it builds.  See REPORT AND 
GUIDELINES, supra note 185, at 2 (focusing on integrating attorneys and law students with 
disabilities into the legal profession); BASF, Guidelines for Accommodation of Lawyers 
and Law Students with Disabilities, available at http://www.sfbar.org/about/ 
diversity.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2003) (also on file with the author).  That 
organization also produced videotape, Breaking Down Barriers: Overcoming 
Discrimination Against Lawyers with Disabilities.  Id. 
 194. NALP, Courting Clerkships: The NALP Judicial Clerkship Study, Introduction 
and Rationale, at http://www.nalp.org/nalpresearch/clrksumm.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 
2003). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at Findings from the Law Students Study.  The report states: “Considerably 
de-emphasized by the students were factors such as a personal connection to the judge 
and the race/ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or disability status of the judge.”  Id. 
 197. Id. at Action Plan to Address These Concerns: I.  The Judiciary. 
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gender, sexual orientation, and age for the legal profession by setting a 
similar goal for their clerkship ranks.”198  Perhaps it was merely an 
oversight that “disability” was not included in this recommendation.  
Perhaps it was not, for the data collected as part of this study do not 
include references to whether law clerks have a disability.  Table 1 
provides “Demographic Characteristics” for the years 1994-98.199  There 
are data on Native Americans, Asian/Pacific Islanders, African-
Americans, Hispanics, Caucasians, and women, but no data on persons 
with disabilities.200  The other tables address race, ethnicity, and gender 
distribution, but not issues relating to disability.201 
In Panel Case No. 15976, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not 
ignore the mandate of state and federal law that discrimination on the 
basis of disability can no longer be tolerated in our society, in the legal 
system, and in the legal profession.  Rather, the court found that conduct 
involving discrimination on the basis of disability, when it involved a 
potential conflict of the “perceived rights” of two persons with 
disabilities, was less serious than the “inherently serious” discrimination 
on the basis of race.202  The rights in question are, as discussed above, 
significantly different.  The right to a fair trial is shared by all litigants, 
whether persons with disabilities or not.  The right not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of disability arises out of the status of 
being a person with a disability and is unique to that group of persons. 
In commentary on this case and the aftermath of it, the chair of the 
Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board made these 
statements: 
Some experienced trial lawyers have argued that the conduct in 
question should never have been a disciplinary matter in the 
first place, citing the lawyer’s critical role as an advocate for 
his client’s interests.  There is certainly a strong intuitive sense, 
especially among trial lawyers, that a lawyer should never be 
subject to discipline for making an argument that he or she 
reasonably believes to be in the client’s interests.203 
There is, not only among persons with disabilities, a strong intuitive 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. NALP, Courting Clerkships: The NALP Judicial Clerkship Study, Table 1. Law 
School Classes 1994-1998—Demographic Characteristics (on file with the author). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Panel Case No. 15976, 653 N.W.2d 452, 458 (Minn. 2002). 
 203. Charles E. Lundberg, Making Private Discipline a Public Matter, BENCH & BAR 
OF MINN. 12, 13 (Feb. 2003). 
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sense that few lawyers would have considered making a comparable 
motion based on the race or sex of a courtroom employee.  The 
peremptory strike cases stress that discrimination on the basis of race and 
gender in jury selection harms the judicial system.  Why should 
discrimination on the basis of disability in the courtroom be any 
different?  The plaintiff exclusion cases discussed above provide part of 
the reason.  The plaintiffs are viewed, by both counsel and the courts, as 
objects that present an injury or a disability.204  Their right to be present 
or not is considered, at least in part, under the Rules of Evidence.205  In 
the present case, the motion to have the law clerk barred from the 
courtroom treated him as an object potentially in evidence.  Plaintiffs 
bring their “object status” to an action, but law clerks do not. 
Today, the judicial system, broadly viewed to include bench and 
bar, jurors, and court personnel, includes more persons of color and more 
women than ever before.  Issues of discrimination on the basis of race 
and gender continue, but progress has been made.  However, few persons 
with evident disabilities practice law or sit on the bench.  Perhaps that is 
why the very presence of a man with serious disabilities prompts 
concerns about the effect that he will have, just being there, on the 
outcome of a case.  When more persons with evident disabilities, more 
persons who use wheelchairs or have personal care attendants or make 
 
 204. See, e.g., Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 785 A.2d 361, 370 n.4 (Md. 
2001) (“If, as we are now told, the intent was to have him brought in on one day for less 
than an hour, the implication is even stronger that his presence would simply be as an 
exhibit, not to implement his constitutional, statutory, or common law right to be 
present.”).  In a prosecution for criminal vehicular operation resulting in injury (“great 
bodily harm”), the trial court allowed the severely injured victim, a young child, to be 
present in the courtroom at the time a physician testified about his injuries.  The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals found no basis for reversal of the conviction: 
At trial, all relevant evidence is admissible.  If, however, the potential for 
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of a piece of evidence, 
the trial court may exclude it.  [The defendant] argues that the trial court 
erred in allowing [the victim] to be present in the courtroom. 
Although [the victim’s] appearance may have been shocking, it was not so 
prejudicial as to forbid [his] presence.  In addition, we note that [the victim] 
was not admitted into evidence nor, as appellant admits in his brief, was [he] 
used for any demonstrative purpose. 
State v. VanWert, 438 N.W.2d 416, 423 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 
442 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1989) (citations omitted). 
 205. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., “Bendectin” Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. 
Supp. 1212, 1224 (S.D. Ohio 1985); Reems v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. and Health Ctr., 536 
N.W.2d 666, 668-69 (N.D. 1995) (stating that the trial court excluded a disabled plaintiff 
from the courtroom under the North Dakota Rules of Evidence 403 because the 
“pathetic” appearance of the plaintiff would be a “distraction”). 
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notes in braille, are present in courthouses, practice law, or decide cases, 
these concerns regarding the impact of a particular courtroom employee 
should be alleviated.  If more persons with disabilities were seen 
practicing law or deciding cases, it is also probable that more 
consideration would be given by the courts and by attorneys to the effect 
that misguided advocacy may have on persons with disabilities. 
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